In light of the pervasive developments of new technologies, such as NBIC (Nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science), it is imperative to produce a coherent and deep reflexion on the human nature, on human intelligence and on the limit of both of them, in order to successfully respond to some technical argumentations that strive to depict humanity as a purely mechanical system. For this purpose, it is interesting to refer to the epistemology and metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas as (...) a stable philosophical reference on Human Nature. Indeed, we find in the works of Aquinas some of the most productive elements that could form a base to our deeper understanding of, and possibly even solutions to some of the most perplexing questions raised in our times by the existence of AI. (shrink)

La quête de la “Métaphysique de l’acte d’être” passe inévitablement par Cornelio Fabro. La “Bibliothèque de la Revue Thomiste”, avec le concours des éditions “Parole et Silence”, a eu la bonne idée de rééditer son maître ouvrage : Participation et causalité selon Saint Thomas d’Aquin. Je m’attendais, comme dans mes explorations précédentes chez Gilson, Mercier et autres, à découvrir un auteur didactique, plus dialecticien et historien que philosophe, pour qui les pétitions de principe pèsent peu devant la faconde (...) des dissertations. Mais au contraire, je dois reconnaître que nous avons devant les yeux un exercice de philosophie de très grande classe, sans comparaison avec les précités. Tout le mal que j’en pourrai dire par la suite, à cause de mon tempérament atrabilaire, doit être mesuré à l’aune de ce jugement premier. (shrink)

This article deals with the doctrine of providence in Thomas Aquinas based on the thinking of the French philosopher Christian Godin: divine providence would provide an understanding of the “totality” (totalité) that concerns not only the entire universe but also each individual. Aquinas gives an Aristotelian explanation of chance, luck and contingency from the divine perspective. Omniscience, omnipotence and divine providence, however, do not contradict the existence of either true contingency in the natural world or freedom but, on the (...) contrary, they support them. In short, the two peculiarities of the doctrine of providence in St. Thomas here exposed are: first, that God’s will is the ultimate foundation of all contingency (and not merely the deficiency of secondary causes); second, that the divine causality cannot be reduced to any of the two groups of created causes (necessary or contingent) but it is only known to us by analogy. (shrink)

The article focuses on an unexamined so far aspect of byzantine philosophy, namely the influence of Arabic philosophy upon byzantine thinkers. Despite the vicinity of Byzantium and Arabic territories, the philosophical interactions were minimal. Scholarios claimed, in a dedicatory epistle to Constantine Paleologus (1405-1453), that he had studied the treatises of Avicenna, Averroes, and other Arab and Persian philosophers. He admitted that Averroes was beyond doubt the best commentator of Aristotle. Scholarios acknowledged that the study of the Arabs contributed immensely (...) to his philosophical education and particularly to the proper understanding of the Aristotelian philosophy (Scholarios, vii.1-6). Scholarios aimed at the enrichment and renewal of Byzantine philosophy. Besides his high esteem for Arabic philosophy, he devoted a large part of his life translating and paraphrasing the Scholastics, especially Aquinas. Despite Scolarios’ claim about his erudition on the Arab and Persian philosophers, a detailed examination of his works proves that in most cases he simply reproduced and incorporated sections from Aquinas’ works, without resorting to the original sources. Scholarios’ references to the Arabs are multiplied in his translations and compendia of Aquinas’ works, but are reduced significantly in his original texts. Frequently Scholarios refrained from mentioning the Arab philosophers, despite the fact that he commented on Aquinas’ passages, which are dedicated to Avicenna or Averroes. On the contrary, Scholarios did not avoid mentioning in detail Aquinas’ Christian or ancient Greek sources. It is obvious that Scholarios did not have a consistent approach towards Arabic philosophy. Most of the times he reproduced loosely Aquinas’ passages, where the latter commented on the Arabs. (shrink)

La somme d’Humbrecht fait preuve d’une érudition peu commune et d’un réel amour de Thomas d’Aquin (mais au détriment d’Aristote, comme c’est de mode). Sa réflexion s’allonge au fil de la plume, en des méandres et des reflux quelquefois difficiles à suivre. Mais donne aussi le sentiment heureux d’une libre méditation de l’auteur voguant au gré de ses pensées, méditation à laquelle il nous invite avec amitié, pourvu que nous acceptions de nous laisser guider. Hélas, si nous branchons un (...) GPS, nous réalisons que nous nous promenons benoîtement au milieu de sables mouvants prêts à nous engloutir tout entiers à chaque pas. (shrink)

Bringing together two aspects of Thomas Aquinas's thought that have been studied separately: his theory of God's concurrence and his theory of instrumental causality, I show how he uses the latter (which I discuss first) to clarify the Proclusian principle that the first cause has a greater influence on an effect than the proximate causes. Thanks to this theory, Aquinas accounts for the fact that it is God who confers existence to every new being that is produced by natural (...) processes, without however negating the agency of secondary, created causes. (shrink)

Résumé : Le thème de la Métaphysique de l’acte d’être a connu un succès jamais démenti au cours du siècle dernier, avec des auteurs comme Gilson, Maritain ou Fabro, pour ne citer que les plus célèbres. Pourtant, des questions de fond n’ont jamais reçu de réponse satisfaisante, et ont laissé le sentiment d’une doctrine inachevée et inachevable. Trois observations contribuent à cette insatisfaction : la quasi-absence d’une telle problématique chez Thomas d’Aquin, les désaccords entre certains points de la théorie (...) ainsi qu’entre les auteurs, et les incompatibilités avec certains thèmes centraux de la philosophie de Thomas d’Aquin. - Abstract: The theme of the Metaphysics of the act of being has known a never denied success over the last century, with authors like Gilson, Maritain or Fabro, to name only the most famous. Nevertheless, some important questions have never been fittingly answered, and have left the feeling of an unachieved and unachievable doctrine. Three observations contribute to this disappointment : a quasi-absence of such a problematic in Thomas Aquinas, contradictions between certain points of the theory as well as between the authors, and incompatibilities with certain central themes of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. (shrink)

Le Commentaire du Traité de l’âme d’Aristote par Thomas d’Aquin, est le cinquième des commentaires fondamentaux des œuvres d’Aristote traduits en langue française. Avec celui des Physiques, de la Métaphysique, de l’Interprétation et des Analytiques, il fonde l’édifice de la philosophie de Thomas d’Aquin et assure les contreforts de sa théologie. Ce traité se présente comme un vaste essai de définition de l’âme et principalement de l’âme humaine, avec en filigrane, une question lancinante : cette âme est-elle immortelle (...) ? (shrink)

C’est un véritable Discours de la Méthode qu’Aristote nous livre avec son traité de la démonstration intitulé Seconds Analytiques. Avec lui, l’auteur parvient au sommet de l’art logique dont il est le véritable inventeur.

Avec son traité de la démonstration intitulé Seconds Analytiques, c’est un véritable discours de la méthode qu’Aristote nous livre. L’auteur parvient au sommet de l’art logique dont il est l’inventeur. Pourtant, de l’avis unanime des interprètes anciens et actuels, nous sommes devant un de ses écrits les plus difficiles à comprendre. C’est pourquoi Thomas d’Aquin a voulu commenter minutieusement ce texte dont il juge la maîtrise essentielle au travail intellectuel. Tous ses écrits, tant philosophiques que théologiques sont, en effet, (...) construits sur cette trame méthodologique qui leur donne force de science. -/- C’est aussi grâce à cette discipline d’esprit partagée, qu’il a pu entrer en dialogue fécond avec les penseurs païens, musulmans et juifs qui l’ont précédé dans la voie ouverte par Aristote. Une invitation pour notre époque de conflits culturels et religieux ? Pour la première fois en langue française, nous en proposons une traduction qui permet à nos contemporains d’accéder à cette école de rigueur pour l’intelligence : la logique. (shrink)

« En écrivant son Traité de l’Interprétation, Aristote a trempé sa plume à l’encre de son esprit ! » L’antique remarque de Cassiodore vaut encore aujourd’hui tant la matière étudiée est complexe et le style ramassé. Aristote démonte les mécanismes du langage philosophique, aux confins de la linguistique et de la métaphysique. Il offre à cette occasion des développements fondateurs sur la formulation de la vérité, les règles de mise en contradiction, les propositions universelles, la contingence des jugements sur le (...) futur, ou encore les redoutables énonciations modales. S’appuyant sur ses prédécesseurs, Thomas d’Aquin en rédige un commentaire hautement structuré, reconnu comme l’un des plus explicites. Demeuré cependant inachevé, il est complété par Thomas de Vio, dit Cajetan, un des premiers grands thomistes et maître logicien. C’est de l’ensemble de ces deux parties de commentaires que nous proposons la traduction ; la seconde pour la première fois en langue française. (shrink)

Pour la première fois en langue française, la traduction du Commentaire des huit livres des Physiques d'Aristote de Thomas d'Aquin, offre la quintessence de ce qu'on a appelé l' « aristotélo-thomisme ». Encore méconnue des spécialistes d'Aristote, l’œuvre constitue pourtant le sommet qui domine toute la tradition philosophique antique et médiévale. Traversant les aléas critiques du modernisme et du scientisme des trois derniers siècles, ce commentaire brille d'une actualité renouvelée grâce à l'évolution des sciences physiques et humaines les (...) plus récentes, avec lesquelles il est étonnamment en accord. Les Leçons sur la Nature (autre titre du livre) d'Aristote sont le porche d'entrée pour quiconque veut approfondir la philosophie et en vivre. Le métaphysicien reçoit d'elles le modèle méthodologique et l'assise conceptuelle pour sa contemplation ; le moraliste en hérite les principes d'une éthique rationnelle et sociale ; le théologien y puise les fondements naturels de sa discipline. En détachant le fonds philosophique de son apparat méthodologique, cette traduction met singulièrement l'un et l'autre en relief. La densité de réflexion se voit ainsi libérée des nombreuses coupures techniques, pour permettre une lecture ininterrompue, tandis que l'ordre de progression, dont Thomas d'Aquin avait un tel souci, est exhaussé pour lui-même. L'ensemble se veut donc autant une oeuvre de méditation qu'un instrument de travail. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose to study the problem of universals in Thomas Aquinas with ‘’analytic glasses’’ (according to the famous phrase of Jonathan Barnes). Starting with the semantic criteria of Peirce used by Armstrong, we propose to present a new reading of the position of Thomas, especially of the De ente et essentia . We introduce the thesis of Thomas Aquinas in contemporary discussions highlighting the difficulty of classifying Thomas Aquinas as a realist or as (...) a universalist. Our main goal is thus to present a new reading of the position of Aquinas, while showing how and why his thesis might be a promising solution in the discussion of the problem of universals. (shrink)

GILBERT JEAN FACCARELLO (Paris, 1950) is professor of economics at Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris, and a member of the Triangle research centre (École Normale Supérieure de Lyon and CNRS). He is presently chair of the ESHET Council (European Society for the History of Economic Thought). He completed his doctoral research in economics at Université de Paris X Nanterre. He has previously taught at the Université de Paris-Dauphine, Université du Maine and École Normale Supérieure de Fontenay/Saint-Cloud (now École Normale Supérieure de (...) Lyon). He is a co-founder of The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, which he co-edited for 20 years with J. L. Cardoso, Heinz D. Kurz, and A. Murphy. With Alain Béraud, he edited the Nouvelle histoire de la pensée économique (La Découverte, 3 volumes, 1992-2000) and, together with Heinz D. Kurz, he is presently editing a Handbook of the History of Economic Analysis (3 volumes, forthcoming with Edward Elgar). -/- EJPE interviewed Gilbert Faccarello about his research career in the history of economic thought, where he has focused especially on old and new classical and Marxian political economy, and French political economy during the 18th and 19th centuries. G. Faccarello discusses his interest not only in the logical structure and context of the economic ideas of past thinkers but also the links between economic thought, philosophy, and religion. (shrink)

This is a review of Mu Peng's recent book on popular religion in rural China.

Review of A. W. Moore's 2003 book on Kant's moral and religious philosophy.

L'ordre des derniers livres de la Métaphysique, tel que Thomas d'Aquin le dégage dans son commentaire, ainsi que le début du livre XIII (Mu) invitent à repenser l'organisation de la fin de l'ouvrage. -/- The order of the last books of Metaphysics, as Thomas Aquinas highlights in his commentary, as well as the beginning of book XIII (Mu) invite to rethink the organization of the end of the work.

When surveying the scholarly literature over Wittgensteinian fideism, it is easy to get the sense that the principal interlocutors, Kai Nielsen and D.Z. Phillips, talk past one another, but finding the right words for appraising the distance between the two voices is difficult. In this paper, I seek to appreciate this intellectual distance through an exploration of the varying philosophical aims of Nielsen and Phillips, of the different intellectual imperatives that guide their respective conceptions of philosophical practice. In so doing, (...) I seek to show how a contemplative mode in philosophy may be used to appraise a philosophical dispute and the terms of disagreement. In this case, a contemplative approach to understanding the dispute would frame Nielsen’s and Phillips’ contributions against the backdrop of the ends they conceive philosophy to have. (shrink)

The goal of this essay is to explain how Wittgenstein's philosophy may be helpful for understanding and addressing challenges to cross-cultural communication in educational contexts. In particular, the notions of “hinge,” “intellectual distance,” and “grounds” from On Certainty will be helpful for identifying cultural differences. Wittgenstein's dialogical conception of philosophy in Philosophical Investigations will be helpful for addressing that cultural difference in conversation. While here can be no panacea to address all potential sources of confusion, Wittgenstein's philosophy has strong resources (...) that are helpful for curbing some of our human tendencies to misunderstand other people. (shrink)

Recent years have seen an increasing amount of studies of the history of the term “religion” and how it figures in conceptions of “the secular” and of cultural differences generally. A recurrent theme in these studies is that “religion” carries associations with Protestant Christianity and thus is not as universal a category as it might appear. The aim of this paper is to explore some resources in Wittgenstein’s philosophy to obtain greater clarity about the contexts of ascription of religion-status to (...) various phenomena and thus to gain perspective on claims made by scholars who investigate the genealogy of the term. While there is good reason to be circumspect about uncritical use of the term “religion” (no less in philosophizing about religions or conducting interreligious dialogue), I argue that instead of abandoning the term or proffering a critical theory of religion, investigation of ascriptions of religion will help philosophers to perceive more clearly the social dynamics that have led to some- one or thing being called religious and thus avoid equivocations that could obstruct the ends of philosophical inquiry or dialogue. (shrink)

In a pair of recent articles, Brian Leftow and Eleonore Stump offer independent, although similar, accounts of the metaphysics of the Incarnation. Both believe that their Aquinas-inspired theories can offer solutions to the kind of Leibniz’s Law problems that can seem to threaten the logical possibility of this traditional Christian doctrine. In this paper, I’ll have a look at their compositional account of the nature of God incarnate. In the end, I believe their position can be seen to have unacceptable (...) philosophical and theological implications, and that is it inadequate to solve the Leibniz’s law problems that motivate it in the first place. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for a version of the Total Evidence view according to which the rational response to disagreement depends upon one's total evidence. I argue that perceptual evidence of a certain kind is significantly weightier than many other types of evidence, including testimonial. Furthermore, what is generally called "The Uniqueness Thesis" is actually a conflation of two distinct principles that I dub "Evidential Uniqueness" and "Rationality Uniqueness." The former principle is likely true but the latter almost certainly (...) false. Seeing why the Rationality Uniqueness fails opens the door to seeing how mutual reasonable disagreement is possible even among those who share the same evidence. (shrink)

Despite overlooking religious topics, Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (PI) has had a large impact in philosophy of religion. This article surveys that influence and the reasons for it. In what follows, I first describe the reception of certain key concepts from the PI in philosophy of religion. Second, I examine a few scattered remarks on religious topics in the PI. Third, I consider the relevance of the PI for contemporary philosophy of religion. I argue that the dialogical nature of the PI, (...) allowing different generations of readers to engage it with their particular philosophical problems, is key to its longterm influence. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that internalistic foundationalist theories of the justification of memory belief are inadequate. Taking a discussion of John Pollock as a starting point, I argue against any theory that requires a memory belief to be based on a phenomenal state in order to be justified. I then consider another version of internalistic foundationalism and claim that it, too, is open to important objections. Finally, I note that both varieties of foundationalism fail to account for the epistemic (...) status of our justified nonoccurrent beliefs, and hence are drastically incomplete. (shrink)

Philosophers and theologians acknowledge that "fideism" is difficult to define but rarely agree on what the best characterization of the term is. In this article, I investigate the history of use of "fideism" to explore why its meaning has been so contested and thus why it has not always been helpful for resolving philosophical problems. I trace the use of the term from its origins in French theology to its current uses in philosophy and theology, concluding that "fideism" is helpful (...) in resolving philosophical problems only when philosophers scrupulously acknowledge the tradition of use that informs their understanding of the word. (shrink)

According to Eric Funkhouser, omnipotence and necessary moral perfection (what Funkhouser calls "impeccability") are not compatible. Funkhouser gives two arguments for this claim. In this paper, I argue that neither of Funkhouser's arguments is sound. The traditional theist can reasonably claim that, contra Funkhouser, (i) there is no possible being who possesses all of God's attributes sans impeccability, and (ii) the fact that there are things that God cannot do does not entail that God lacks omnipotence. Armed with (i) and (...) (ii), the theist has all that is needed to refute Funkhouser's arguments. (shrink)

Traditionally, the term ’God’ has been understood either as a proper name or as a description. However, according to a new view, the term God’ in a sentence like "Jesus Christ is God" functions as a kind term, much as the term ’tiger’ functions in the sentence "Tigger is a tiger." In this paper I examine the claim that divinity can be construed as a ’supernatural’ kind, developing the outlines of an account of the semantics of God’ along these lines, (...) and suggest that it might solve an important philosophical problem concerning the Incarnation. (shrink)

Despite the growth in research in philosophy of religion over the past several decades, recent years have seen a number of critical studies of this subfield in an effort to redirect the methods and topics of inquiry. This article argues that in addition to problems of religious parochialism described by critics such as Wesley Wildman, the subfield is facing a problem of relevance. In responding to this problem, it suggests that philosophers of religion should do three things: first, be critically (...) self-aware about their aims of inquiry; second, investigate concepts used by other philosophers, scientists, and religious studies scholars to identify and dispel confusion about religions; and third, following the model of applied ethics, work to clarify concepts and advance arguments of contemporary practical urgency. (shrink)

Timothy O’Connor’s book Theism and Ultimate Explanation offers a defense of a new version of the cosmological argument. In his discussion, O’Connor argues against the coherence of a brute fact “explanation” of the universe and for the claim that the God of theism cannot be logically contingent. In this paper, I take issue with both of these arguments. Regarding the former, I claim that contrary to what O’Connor asserts, we have no good reason to prefer an account according to which (...) the universe is explained via a necessary being to that of a naturalist who thinks that the universe is contingent and ultimately unexplained. Regarding the latter, I argue that the possibility of a logically contingent God is fully consistent with traditional theism. (shrink)

The New Demon World Objection claims that reliabilist accounts of justification are mistaken because there are justified empirical beliefs at demon worlds—worlds at which the subjects are systematically deceived by a Cartesian demon. In this paper, I defend strongly verific (but not necessarily reliabilist) accounts of justification by claiming that there are two ways to construct a theory of justification: by analyzing our ordinary concept of justification or by taking justification to be a theoretic term defined by its role in (...) the theory of knowledge. The former route is not promising because of the splintered nature of our ordinary concept of justification—or perhaps because there is no single such concept. On the other hand, if justification is defined by the role it plays in the theory of knowledge, then there is good reason to think that justification must be strongly truth-conductive since the term was introduced by Edmund Gettier to play the primary role in converting true belief into knowledge. And if that is right, then there will be no justified empirical belief at demon worlds. The real lesson of the demon world is then turned on its head: justification does not supervene on what one shares with one’s deceived doppelganger. (shrink)

In the third chapter of his book Psychosemantics , Jerry A. Fodor argues that the truth of meaning holism (the thesis that the content of a psychological state is determined by the totality of that state's epistemic liaisons) would be fatal for intentionalistic psychology. This is because holism suggests that no two people are ever in the same intentional state, and so a psychological theory that generalizes over such states will be composed of generalizations which fail to generalize. Fodor then (...) sets out to show that there is no reason to believe in holism by arguing that its primary foundation (i.e. functional-role semantics), when properly understood (i.e. when construed as a two-factor theory of content), is demonstrably false. In this paper, I argue two claims. First, I try to show that Fodor has seriously misrepresented two-factor theories and that his arguments against his strawman do nothing to indicate the falsity of the genuine article. Second, I argue that if one accepts meaning holism in the form of a two-factor theory, there is no particular reason to think that one is hereby committed to the futility of intentionalistic psychology. In making this point, I make a brief excursion into the psychological literature during which I discuss the belief perseverance phenomenon, the encoding specificity hypothesis, and a problem in human deductive reasoning. My second argument leads to a discussion of how such a psychology could be developed even if no two people are ever in the same intentional state. (shrink)

In recent years, philosophers have used expressions of Wittgenstein’s (e.g. “language-games,” “form of life,” and “family resemblance”) in attempts to conceive of the discipline of philosophy in a broad, open, and perhaps global way. These Wittgenstein-inspired approaches indicate an awareness of the importance of cultural and historical diversity for approaching philosophical questions. While some philosophers have taken inspiration from Wittgenstein in embracing contextualism in philosophical hermeneutics, Wittgenstein himself was more instrumental than contextual in his treatment of other philosophers; his focus (...) in his writings was on his own philosophical problems. Does this mean that Wittgensteinian philosophy is a poor resource after all for comparative, cross-cultural, or globally-engaged philosophy (i.e. if it is properly Wittgensteinian)? In this article, I examine the relevance of Wittgenstein to contextually-sensitive philosophy through studies of his conceptions of history and culture, his interest in Spengler’s philosophy of history, and recent scholarship by Hans-Johann Glock and Hans Sluga on the place of contextualism in Wittgenstein’s analysis of philosophical problems. Ultimately, this article advances the view that there are strong resources in Wittgenstein’s philosophy for those seeking a more globally-engaged approach to the field. (shrink)